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11 Introduction
Ever since the pioneering work of Krugman [9], the core-periphery model has been criticized
because it does not ﬁt well contemporary space-economies. First, nowadays, the main
dispersion force seems to lie in the existence of urban costs, deﬁned as the sum of housing
and commuting costs, borne by workers living in large agglomerations, and not in the
agricultural sector whose share in employment and expenditure has sharply decreased in
most industrialized countries. Second, Krugman’s model fails to recognize that economic
agglomerations typically generate higher costs to be paid by residents when the population
size rises. Yet, such costs are unavoidable once agglomeration takes the form of a city.
In this perspective, two papers are worth mentioning. Firstly, Tabuchi [15] may be
viewed as an attempt to unify urban economics ` a la Alonso [1] and new economic geogra-
phy. Indeed, his model allows for the interplay between commuting costs and transportation
costs in a spatial economy. Unfortunately, however, his analysis has a signiﬁcant short-
coming: analytical results are available only for the two extreme cases of zero and inﬁnite
transportation costs. Independently, Helpman [7] has introduced a housing market into an
economic geography model in which all workers are mobile. However, cities have no spatial
extension in his setting because Helpman abstracts from commuting costs. In addition, his
treatment of the model is purely numerical.
The aim of this paper is to propose a simple model of economic geography integrat-
ing both transportation and commuting costs when labor is homogeneous and mobile. As
usual, the agglomeration force ﬁnds its origin in the need to reduce transportation costs
of manufactured goods, but the main dispersion forces now stem from land consumption
and the resulting need for workers to commute. While retaining the general equilibrium
framework of monopolistic competition ` a la Dixit-Stiglitz [4], we introduce iceberg com-
muting costs, as in Krugman and Livas Elizondo [10] or Duranton and Puga [5], together
with the standard iceberg transportation costs of economic geography.1 The use of the
same modeling strategy for both types of spatial costs presents several advantages.
In this respect, the following results stand out. First, unlike Krugman [9], agglomer-
ation is a stable equilibrium when transportation costs are large but dispersion prevails
when they are low. Second, agglomeration is always a stable equilibrium once commuting
costs are suﬃciently low. Third, whereas there always exists a sustain point (i.e. a level
of transportation costs above which agglomeration is a stable equilibrium), a break point
(i.e. a level of transportation costs above which dispersion is unstable) may not exist.
Fourth, we work with a Dixit-Stiglitz-iceberg model that is “almost” analytically solvable
by means of paper and pencil. In particular, we are able to determine the exact analytical
expressions for both the break and sustain points, thus making their comparison easier.
1Note that Tabuchi and Thisse [16] develop a similar approach using a completely diﬀerent modeling
strategy: the proﬁt-maximizing price varies with the mass of competing ﬁrms, but there is no income eﬀect
in consumer demand (see Ottaviano et al. [12]).
2Interestingly, we may go one step further by determining the break and sustain points in
terms of commuting costs, which are the counterpart of the standard break and sustain
points. However, a complete characterization of the set of equilibria is out of reach. Last,
we uncover a new eﬀect: because workers save time on commuting when there is dispersion,
more labor is available for production, thus implying a larger total mass of varieties at the
symmetric equilibrium than when agglomeration prevails. This new dispersion force cap-
tures (although indirectly) the well-known idea that the formation of large agglomerations
takes resources away from private consumption because of the construction of major urban
infrastructures.
Our results thus suggest that a more integrated economy need not be more agglomerated.
Quite the opposite: we show that low transportation costs lead to the dispersion of economic
activities because this allows workers to alleviate the burden of urban costs. In accord with
what economic historians have observed (see, e.g. Bairoch [3]; Hohenberg and Lees [8]),
the agglomeration is more likely to arise when commuting costs within cities get smaller
and smaller. In this respect, it is worth noting that if the process of globalization aﬀects
the shipping costs of commodities, it has no direct impact on workers’ commuting costs.
Globalization need not, therefore, lead to a more polarized economic space. Instead, it
might well favor a more dispersed space-economy.
The model is introduced in Section 2. The properties of the spatial equilibrium are
derived in Section 3, whereas Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The spatial economy
Consider an economy involving two regions (labelled r =1 ,2), one industrial sector pro-
ducing a diﬀerentiated product by using labor as its sole input, and two goods (the diﬀer-
entiated product and land). The economy is endowed with a unit mass of identical and
mobile workers, as well as with a large amount of land in each region. Each worker owns
one unit of labor. Let λ denote the fraction of workers residing in region 1 so that the mass
of workers in regions 1 and 2 is respectively given by L1 = λ and L2 =1− λ.2
The welfare of a worker depends on her consumption of the two goods. The ﬁrst good is
supplied as a continuum of varieties of a horizontally diﬀerentiated good, produced under
monopolistic competition and increasing returns. Any variety of this good can be shipped
from one region to the other according to an iceberg transportation technology: T>1
units of the variety must be sent from the origin for one unit to arrive at destination; T
thus accounts for all the impediments to trade.
2It would be easy to expand our setting by allowing either a fraction of the labor force to be immobile or
the workers to be heterogeneous in their perception of urban features, for each region to retain a minimum
positive population size.
3The second good is land and is perfectly immobile. Each region is formed by a city
spread along a one-dimensional space X. The amount of land available at each location
x ∈ X is equal to one. All ﬁrms located in region r are set up at the Central Business
District (in short CBD) situated at the origin x =0o fX.
Each worker consumes one unit of land, supplies one unit of labor, and commutes to
the CBD. Hence, in equilibrium, workers are equally distributed around the CBD of region
r whose urban landscape is therefore given by [−Lr/2,L r/2]. We assume that commuting
costs have the nature of an iceberg, thus implying that the eﬀective labor supply by a
worker living at a distance |x| from the CBD is given by
s(x)=1− 2θ|x| x ∈ [−Lr/2,L r/2]
where θ>0 captures the eﬃciency loss due to commuting. For s(x) to be positive regardless
of the spatial distribution of workers, we assume θ<1 throughout the paper. As a result,
the total eﬀective labor supply in region r is given by
Sr =
 Lr/2
−Lr/2
s(x)dx = Lr(1 − θLr/2). (1)
We normalize the land rent at both city edges at zero. Then, if wr stands for the wage
rate paid to the workers by the ﬁrms at the CBD of region r, the wage net of commuting
costs earned by a worker residing at either edge is such that:
s(−Lr/2)wr = s(Lr/2)wr =( 1− θLr)wr.
Because workers are identical, the wage net of both commuting costs and land rent must be
equal across all locations. Thus, it must be that s(x)wr−Rr(x)=s(−Lr/2)wr = s(Lr/2)wr
where Rr(x) is the land rent prevailing in region r at a distance |x| <L r/2 from its CBD.
Then, for a given distribution of workers across regions, the equilibrium land rent in region
r is given by
R
∗
r(x)=θ(Lr − 2|x|)wr.
The aggregate land rent in region r is then equal to
ALRr =
 Lr/2
−Lr/2
R
∗
r(x)dx = θL
2
rwr/2.
It remains to describe how this aggregate land rent is distributed. We consider each
region as an independent jurisdiction that owns the land of its region only. This is a
reasonable assumption as long as there exists no “global government”. As a result, each
worker living in region r owns an equal share of land in her region of residence. Accordingly,
in addition to her wage, each worker receives an income ALRr/Lr = θLrwr/2 from her
land ownership.3
3Tabuchi [15] assumes absentee landlords, whereas there is global land ownership in Helpman [7].
42.2 Consumption
Regarding the consumption of the diﬀerentiated good, each worker in region r maximizes
a CES-utility function given by
Ur =

i∈Ir
crr(i)
σ−1
σ di +

i∈Is
crs(i)
σ−1
σ di
 σ
σ−1
subject to the budget constraint

i∈Ir
pr(i)crr(i)di +

i∈Is
ps(i)Tc rs(i)di =( 1 − θLr)wr + θLrwr/2
=( 1 − θLr/2)wr
where Ir is the set of varieties produced in region r. Then, her consumption for each variety
is
crr(i)=pr(i)
−σP
σ−1
r (1 − θLr/2)wr
crs(i)=ps(i)
−σT
−σP
σ−1
r (1 − θLr/2)wr
where the price index in region r is given by
Pr =

i∈Ir
pr(i)
1−σdi +

i∈Is
ps(i)
1−σT
1−σdi
 1
1−σ
.
It is then readily veriﬁed that her indirect utility is as follows:
Vr =
(1 − θLr/2)wr
Pr
. (2)
Workers are attracted by the region that yields the higher utility level so that their
mobility may be described by the following adjustment process:
˙ Lr =( Vr − ¯ V )Lr
where ¯ V ≡ V1L1 + V2L2. Clearly, migrations stop once Lr = 0 in one region.
2.3 Production
The labor input requirement for producing yr units of variety i is given by
lr(i)=F + vyr(i)
where F and v stand for the ﬁxed and marginal labor inputs, respectively. Given the above
consumer demand, each ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁt
πr(i)=pr(i)yr(i) − wr[F + vyr(i)]
5where yr(i) is given by
yr(i)=crr(i)Lr + Tc sr(i)Ls.
It is well known that ﬁrm i’s proﬁt-maximizing price has the following form:
p
∗
r(i)=
σv
σ − 1
wr.
Recalling that v stands for the number of labor units needed to produce one unit of the
diﬀerentiated product, without loss of generality we may then choose the unit of this good
for v to satisfy the condition σv/(σ − 1) = 1, so that p∗
r(i)=wr.
Finally, the zero-proﬁt condition yields y∗
r(i)=σF. In what follows, we choose the
unit of labor such that σF = 1 so that the proﬁt-maximizing output of a ﬁrm becomes
y∗
r(i) = 1. It then follows from our two normalization rules that
l
∗
r(i)=
1
σ
+ v =
1
σ
+
σ − 1
σ
=1 .
3 The spatial equilibrium
3.1 Preliminary results
Let Nr be the mass of ﬁrms located in region r. The labor market equilibrium condition
in region r is given by
 Nr
0
l
∗
r(i)di = Sr (3)
so that Nr = Sr. Then, we have the following relationship between the total mass of
varieties and the spatial distribution of workers.
Proposition 1. The more symmetric the spatial distribution of workers, the larger the
total mass of varieties in the economy.
Proof. Diﬀerentiating the total mass of varieties with respect to λ, we have
∂(N1 + N2)
∂λ
=
∂(S1 + S2)
∂λ
= θ(1 − 2λ)
∂2(N1 + N2)
∂λ2 =
∂2(S1 + S2)
∂λ2 = −2θ<0.
Thus, the total mass of varieties is maximized at λ =1 /2 and declines as λ increases or
decreases from λ =1 /2.
6Intuitively, when the economy is dispersed, commuting costs are lower, thus implying
that more labor is available for the industrial sector. The fact that the total mass of
varieties varies with the spatial distribution of workers makes our model more general than
the existing ones in which the total number of varieties is constant regardless of the spatial
distribution of ﬁrms.4 More precisely, Proposition 1 shows that agglomeration generates two
types of costs for the workers: higher urban costs as well as a narrower range of varieties.I t
is worth stressing that this result is obtained in the absence of any technological externality.
The market clearing conditions for the diﬀerentiated product are as follows:
c11(i)L1 + Tc 21(i)L2 =1
Tc 12(i)L1 + c22(i)L2 =1 .
These equations yield the two wage equations:
w
σ
1 = P
σ−1
1 S1w1 + T
1−σP
σ−1
2 S2w2
w
σ
2 = T
1−σP
σ−1
1 S1w1 + P
σ−1
2 S2w2
where the price indices can be rewritten as
P1 =

S1w
1−σ
1 + S2(w2T)
1−σ 1
1−σ
P2 =

S1(w1T)
1−σ + S2w
1−σ
2
 1
1−σ .
As in Murata [11], for any given λ, hence S1 and S2, the above four equations can be shown
to have a unique solution for {P1,P 2,w 1,w 2}.
3.2 The interplay between transportation and commuting costs
In this model, urban costs act as a dispersion force through workers’ income, whereas trans-
portation costs generate an agglomeration force through the price index. The argument
involves three steps.
First, let ω ≡ w1/w2 and ε ≡ S1/(S1 + S2). For any given value of ε, ω is implicitly
determined from either of the two wage equations by means of the following expression:
ε =
1
1+
ω1−2σ−ω1−σT 1−σ
1−ω−σT 1−σ
.
Murata [11] shows that ε is strictly increasing in ω over the interval for which ε ∈ (0,1),
so that there exists an inverse function ω(ε), which is also strictly increasing.
4In a special, but analytically solvable, version of the economic geography model with vertical linkages,
Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud [13] show that the total mass of varieties is larger at the core-periphery
equilibrium than at the symmetric equilibrium.
7Second, we determine the relative utility across regions:
V2[λ,ε(λ),ω(ε(λ))]
V1[λ,ε(λ),ω(ε(λ))]
=
1 − θ(1 − λ)/2
1 − θλ/2
w2/P2
w1/P1
=
1 − θ(1 − λ)/2
1 − θλ/2
  	
U(λ)

ε(λ)+( 1− ε(λ))T 1−σω(ε(λ))σ−1
ε(λ)ω(ε(λ))1−σT 1−σ +( 1− ε(λ))
 1
1−σ
  	
T (λ)
where
ε(λ)=
S1(λ)
S1(λ)+S2(λ)
=
λ(2 − θλ)
2 − θ[λ2 +( 1− λ)2]
is viewed as a function of λ, which is such that
∂ε(λ)
∂λ
> 0.
Clearly, U(λ) integrates the impact of urban costs and T (λ) that of transportation costs.
Note that the value of T (λ) depends on the mass of varieties produced in each region. As
shown by (1) and (3), Nr depends itself on Sr, which in turn depends on the value of θ.
Last, because ω(ε) is strictly increasing in ε and ε(λ) strictly increasing in λ, it is readily
veriﬁed that:
dU(λ)
dλ
> 0
dT (λ)
dλ
< 0.
Since T =( w2/P2)/(w1/P1), a decrease in T means that region 1 becomes relatively more
attractive. Therefore, the two foregoing inequalities imply that a rise in the population
of region 1 strengthens both the dispersion force - associated with urban costs - and the
agglomeration force - generated by transportation costs. As expected, the equilibrium share
of workers located in region 1 is the outcome of these two opposite forces.
3.3 Symmetry
To start with, we focus on the symmetric conﬁguration λ =1 /2. Clearly, this conﬁgura-
tion is always a spatial equilibrium. To study its stability, we derive the elasticity of the
indirect utility in one region with respect to the number of workers in that region. Totally
diﬀerentiating Vr and evaluating the resulting expression at λ =1 /2, we obtain
dVr
Vr
= −
θLr/2
1 − θLr/2
dLr
Lr
+
dwr
wr
−
dPr
Pr
r =1 ,2. (4)
Let
Z ≡
1 − T 1−σ
1+T 1−σ ∈ (0,1). (5)
8Then, the wage equations imply

σ
Z
− 1
 dwr
wr




λ=1/2
=( σ − 1)
dPr
Pr




λ=1/2
+
dSr
Sr




λ=1/2
r =1 ,2. (6)
Similarly, totally diﬀerentiating the price indices yields


1 − σ
Z

dPr
Pr




λ=1/2
=( 1− σ)
dwr
wr




λ=1/2
+
dSr
Sr




λ=1/2
r =1 ,2. (7)
Solving (6) and (7) for dwr/wr and dPr/Pr, we get
dwr
wr




λ=1/2
=
Z
σ(Z +1 )− Z
dSr
Sr




λ=1/2
r =1 ,2 (8)
dPr
Pr

 

λ=1/2
= −
σZ
(σ − 1)[σ(Z +1 )− Z]
dSr
Sr

 

λ=1/2
r =1 ,2 (9)
where
dSr
Sr
=
1 − θLr
1 − θLr/2
dLr
Lr
r =1 ,2 (10)
from (1). Inserting (8), (9), and (10) into (4), we have the elasticity of the indirect utility
at λ =1 /2:
Lr
Vr
dVr
dLr




λ=1/2
=
4 − 2θ
4 − θ

(2σ − 1)Z
(σ − 1)[σ(Z +1 )− Z]
−
θ
2(2 − θ)

. (11)
This expression will allow us to prove the following property.
Proposition 2. The symmetric equilibrium is stable if and only if
Ω(Z) ≡
(2σ − 1)Z
(σ − 1)[σ(Z +1 )− Z]
<
θ
2(2 − θ)
≡ Γ(θ).
Proof. It follows immediately from (11) that
Lr
Vr
dVr
dLr

 

λ=1/2
< 0 ⇐⇒
(2σ − 1)Z
(σ − 1)[σ(Z +1 )− Z]
<
θ
2(2 − θ)
.
Noting that ∂Ω(Z)/∂Z > 0, ∂Z/∂T > 0 and ∂Γ(θ)/∂θ > 0, we are able to derive
the analytical expression for the break point in terms of transportation costs, called the
T-break point, at which the symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable.
9Proposition 3. If θ ∈

0,min{ 4
σ+1,1}

, then there exists a unique T-break point given by
T
b =

(2σ − 1)[1 − (σ − 1)Γ(θ)]
(2σ − 1) + (σ − 1)Γ(θ)
 1
1−σ
(12)
and the symmetric conﬁguration is a stable equilibrium if and only if T<T b. However,
there exists no T-break point and the symmetric equilibrium is always stable regardless of
transportation costs if and only if σ>3 and θ ∈

4
σ+1,1

.
Proof. We know ∂Ω(Z)/∂Z > 0 and Z ∈ (0,1). This implies Ω(Z) ∈

0,
1
σ−1

. Thus, if
Γ(θ) ∈

0, 1
σ−1

or, equivalently as θ<1, if θ ∈

0,min{ 4
σ+1,1}

, we have a unique value
of Z that satisﬁes
Lr
Vr
dVr
dLr




λ=1/2
= 0 (13)
(or Ω(Z)=Γ ( θ)). Since ∂Z/∂T > 0, there exists a unique value of T, denoted by T b, such
that (13) holds. Solving (13) for T, we have the desired expression for T b. In addition,
T<T b implies
Lr
Vr
dVr
dLr




λ=1/2
< 0
so that the symmetric conﬁguration is stable; and vice versa.
If σ>3 and θ ∈

4
σ+1,1

, we have
Lr
Vr
dVr
dLr




λ=1/2
< 0
for all transportation costs T ∈ (1,∞). In this case, there exists no T-break point so that
the symmetric conﬁguration is always a stable equilibrium.
When varieties are fairly close substitutes (σ>3), the beneﬁt of a better access to
all varieties is small. Hence, when commuting costs are suﬃciently large (θ>4/(σ +
1)), the symmetric conﬁguration is always stable, unlike what we observe in the standard
core-periphery model. By contrast, when one of these two conditions does not hold, the
symmetric conﬁguration may become unstable. Indeed, despite the fact that the whole
range of varieties in the economy shrinks when workers are agglomerated (Proposition 1),
they beneﬁt from the access to a wider array of local varieties. When transportation costs
are high (T ≥ T b), the net beneﬁt of having all varieties locally produced is suﬃciently
large to outweigh the higher urban costs that workers must bear by being agglomerated.
As shown by Proposition 3, this is so if varieties are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated (σ ≤ 3), or
if commuting costs are suﬃciently low (θ ≤ 4/(σ + 1)), or both.
10Alternatively, we can derive the break point in terms of commuting costs, which we call
the θ-break point.
Proposition 4. If σ>3, or if both σ ≤ 3 and
T<T ≡

(2σ − 1)(3 − σ)
5σ − 3
 1
1−σ
∈ (1,∞),
then there exists a unique θ-break point given by
θ
b =
4(2σ − 1)Z
(σ2 +2 σ − 1)Z + σ(σ − 1)
(14)
and the symmetric conﬁguration is a stable equilibrium if and only if θ>θ b. If both σ ≤ 3
and T ≥ T, there exists no θ-break point and the symmetric equilibrium is always unstable
regardless of commuting costs.
Proof. Solving
Lr
Vr
dVr
dLr




λ=1/2
=0
(or Ω(Z)=Γ ( θ)) for θ, we get the foregoing expression for θb. Since θb is increasing in Z
and Z ∈ (0,1), it follows that θb belongs to

0, 4
σ+1

.I fσ>3, then θb < 1 regardless of
the value of T. Because
Lr
Vr
dVr
dLr


 
λ=1/2
< 0
when θ>θ b, the symmetric conﬁguration is stable; and vice versa.
By contrast, when σ ≤ 3, there exists a single value
Z =
σ(σ − 1)
−σ2 +6 σ − 3
∈ (0,1]
such that θb < 1 if and only if Z<Z. Using (5) then yields the upper bound T on T.
Hence, there is no θ-break point if and only if T ≥ T. Finally, when σ ≤ 3 and T<T,i t
is readily veriﬁed that the θ-break point is unique and given by θb < 1.
Note that (14) is the reciprocal relationship of (12). In addition, at the border value
σ = 3, the domain

4
σ+1,1

is empty whereas T goes to inﬁnity. Accordingly, Proposition
4 may be viewed as the counterpart of Proposition 3 in terms of commuting costs.
113.4 Agglomeration
We now come to the case of an agglomeration (λ = 1). Then, the price indices yield the
relationship
P2 = TP 1.
Similarly, from the wage equations, we have
w2 = T
1−σ
σ w1.
These two relationships imply that the ratio of indirect utilities is given by
V2
V1




λ=1
=
T
1−2σ
σ
1 − θ/2
. (15)
Using this relationship, the sustainability of agglomeration as a spatial equilibrium can be
obtained under the following conditions.
Proposition 5. Agglomeration is a spatial equilibrium if and only if T>(1 − θ/2)
σ
1−2σ.
Proof. From (15), we have
V2
V1


 
λ=1
< 1 ⇐⇒ T>(1 − θ/2)
σ
1−2σ.
The analytical expression of the T-sustain point may then be obtained as follows.
Proposition 6. The T-sustain point is given by
T
s =( 1− θ/2)
σ
1−2σ (16)
and agglomeration is a stable equilibrium if and only if T>T s.
Proof. Because
V2
V1




λ=1
=1
must hold at the T-sustain point, we obtain the desired expression.
This proposition conﬁrms the numerical simulations provided by Helpman [7]. In fact,
our result is even stronger than Helpman’s because the array of varieties available in the
12agglomeration is narrower than what it is under dispersion. Our result can be understood as
follows. Workers are willing to bear the high urban costs associated with their agglomeration
within a single city as well as the consumption of a narrower range of varieties because
buying varieties from the other region is very expensive.
In the same vein, the θ-sustain point is derived below.
Proposition 7. If T ∈ (1,2
σ
2σ−1), then there exists a unique θ-sustain point given by
θ
s = 2(1 − T
1−2σ
σ ) (17)
and agglomeration is a stable equilibrium if and only if θ<θ s. If T ∈ [2
σ
2σ−1,∞), then
agglomeration is sustainable for all commuting costs.
Proof. Solving V2/V1 = 1 for θ, we get the foregoing expression. Because θs must be smaller
than 1, we get the second part of the claim.
Note that (17) is the reciprocal of (16) so that Proposition 7 is the reciprocal of Propo-
sition 6 in terms of commuting costs.
3.5 Break point versus sustain point
As in Fujita et al. [6], the sustain point does not coincide with the break point in our model.
It is, therefore, worthwhile to examine the relative magnitude of these points.5
Proposition 8. Assume that a T-break point exists. Then, the T-sustain point is smaller
than the T-break point.
Proof. Consider the ratio of the T-sustain and T-break points. Taking the limit of this
ratio when θ tends to zero, we have
lim
θ→+0
T s
T b =1 .
We now show that the ratio decreases as θ rises from 0. Diﬀerentiating the ratio with
respect to θ yields
sgn

∂
∂θ


T s
T b

= sgnΦ(θ,σ)
where Φ(θ,σ) ≡− 8σ2+(σ+1)(3σ−1)θ. We know that θ must be lower than min{4/(σ +1 ) ,1}
for a T-break point to exist. Clearly, Φ(θ,σ) is increasing in θ. Because both Φ(
4
σ+1,σ)=
5Note that Robert-Nicoud [14] analyzes the relative magnitude of these two points for a family of
economic geography models. Unfortunately, our model does not belong to this family, thus implying that
we cannot use his results.
13−4(2σ − 1)(σ − 1) < 0 and Φ(1,σ)=−5σ2 +2 σ − 1 < 0, it must be that Φ(θ,σ) < 0 for
all θ<min{4/(σ +1 ) ,1}. Thus, T s/T b < 1 for all θ ∈ (0,min{4/(σ +1 ) ,1}).
Proposition 9. When they exist, the θ-sustain point is larger than the θ-break point.
Proof. Assume that σ ≤ 3 or that σ>3 and θ ∈ (0,4/(σ+1)). Then, for any admissible θ,
there exists a break point in terms of transportation costs. In turn, Proposition 8 implies
that T b >T s for any admissible θ. From Propositions 4 and 7, it follows that θb and θs are
increasing in T. By construction, θb is the reciprocal of (12), whereas θs is the reciprocal
of (16). Consequently, it must be that θs >θ b for any T. Indeed, θs ≤ θb would imply
T b ≤ T s for some θ, thus contradicting Proposition 8.
Consider now the case where σ>3 and θ ∈ [4/(σ +1 ) ,1). The curve (14) is always
strictly below the horizontal line at θ, whereas the curve (17) intersects this line once
because T s always exists and is unique. Hence, it must be that θs >θ b for any T.
The foregoing results are somewhat reminiscent of those derived in standard models of
economic geography. However, there are major and striking diﬀerences. First, in accord
with Helpman’s [7] simulations, agglomeration is a stable equilibrium when transportation
costs are suﬃciently large. However, as in Anas [2], a steady decrease in transportation
costs always leads to the dispersion of the industry. Second, agglomeration is always a
stable equilibrium once commuting costs are low enough. Furthermore, once transportation
costs take low values, agglomeration necessarily arises provided that commuting costs are
themselves suﬃciently low. Note also that agglomeration may even arise under intermediate
or large commuting costs when transportation costs are suﬃciently large.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Third, whereas there always exists a T-sustain point, a T-break point may not exist in
our model. In Figure 1a, drawn for σ ≤ 3, a T-break point exists because the curve θb(T),
given by the function (14), intersects once the horizontal line at θ = 1. By contrast, in
Figure 1b drawn for σ>3, this curve has a horizontal asymptote at θ =4 /(σ +1 )< 1.
Hence, it does not intersect the horizontal line at θ = 1, implying that there exists no
T-break point as long as 4/(σ +1 )≤ θ<1. Consider now the curve θs(T) deﬁned by the
function (17). In both ﬁgures, this curve intersects the horizontal line at θ = 1, so that a T-
sustain point always exists. More surprisingly maybe, the existence of a θ-break point and
of a θ-sustain point is not guaranteed. Hence, the relationship between transportation costs
and commuting costs is not necessarily one-to-one over the domain (T,θ) ∈ (1,∞)×(0,1).
Last, unlike Fujita et al. [6] and others, we have been able to derive the explicit analytical
expressions for both the T-break and T-sustain points. Note that we can also determine
14the θ-break and θ-sustain points (when they exist). This will allow us to describe below
the interplay between these two types of costs in the formation of the space-economy.
Observe that agglomeration is sustainable in the region below θs(T), whereas dispersion
is a stable equilibrium in the region above θb(T). As a result, in the region situated between
the two curves, there exist at least three stable equilibria. Unfortunately, as mentioned
in the introduction, we have not been able to provide a full characterization of the set of
equilibria. This is why, in the next section, we appeal to numerical solutions.
3.6 The set of equilibria: numerical examples
The market outcome is driven by three main parameters: (i) the commuting cost, θ>
0, (ii) the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated goods, σ>1, and (iii) the
transportation costs, T>1. In order to illustrate the role of the four points discussed in
the foregoing, we impose the restriction σ ≤ 3, which implies that θ may take any value in
(0,1).
Figure 2 is depicted for θ =0 .200 and σ =2 .5 so that T s =1 .068 and T b =1 .074.
Transportation costs take three possible values: T =1 .090, T =1 .072 (which will be
selected in the next experiment on commuting costs) and T =1 .050. In the ﬁrst case (Figure
2a), there are three equilibria, but dispersion is unstable while full agglomeration within a
single city is the only stable equilibrium as T is larger than T b. In the second (Figure 2b),
there exist ﬁve equilibria: the two (mirror) equilibria involving partial agglomeration in
two cities of unequal size are unstable, whereas the other three equilibria, corresponding to
dispersion or full agglomeration, are stable because the value of T belongs to [T s,Tb]. In
the last case (Figure 2c), the only equilibrium involves two cities of equal size and is stable,
T being smaller than T s. Such a pattern concurs with what Krugman [9] have obtained in
the core-periphery model, except that the sequence of conﬁgurations is reversed.
In Krugman [9], the only cost generated by the formation of an agglomeration is related
to the provision of the manufactured goods to the – by assumption – immobile farmers
residing in the periphery. Here, agglomerating ﬁrms give rise to speciﬁc costs, i.e. higher
urban costs and a narrower range of varieties, which workers are willing to bear provided
that shipping the manufactured goods between regions is expensive. Hence, when trans-
portation costs are low, workers are better oﬀ by being dispersed. Accordingly, we may
conclude that the interplay of agglomeration and dispersion forces changes with the nature
of the forces at work.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Figure 3 is depicted for T =1 .072 (which has been chosen above) and σ =2 .5 so that
θb =0 .189 and θs =0 .205. Commuting costs are allowed to take the following values:
15θ =0 .220, θ =0 .200 (which has also been selected in the foregoing experiment) and
θ =0 .180. In the ﬁrst case (Figure 3a), the only stable equilibrium involves two cities of
equal size. In the second (Figure 3b), there exist ﬁve equilibria in which dispersion and
full agglomeration are the only ones that are stable as long as θ belongs to [θb,θ s]. In the
last case (Figure 3c), full agglomeration is the only stable equilibrium. Again, a pattern
similar to the one derived in the core-periphery model emerges. However, the role of the
two spatial costs is reversed: low commuting costs instead of high transportation costs foster
agglomeration, and vice versa.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
4 Concluding remarks
This paper has provided a simple and uniﬁed treatment of the interactions between the
transportation costs of goods and the commuting costs borne by workers. This is best
shown by comparing the values of workers’ welfare reached at each of the two equilibrium
conﬁgurations. Indeed, we have
V
A =( N
A)
σ
σ−1 V
D =( N
D)
σ
σ−1


1+T 1−σ
2
 1
σ−1
where the superscript A (resp. D) stands for agglomeration (resp. dispersion). Conse-
quently, by being agglomerated, workers save on the transportation costs of the diﬀeren-
tiated product, but have access to a narrower range of varieties. By contrast, by being
dispersed, workers have access to a broader range of varieties, but must then bear the cost
of shipping the varieties produced in the other city. The equilibrium outcome shows how
the market solves this trade-oﬀ.
Using a Dixit-Stiglitz-iceberg framework, we have also been able to determine the four
threshold values corresponding to the break and sustain points, and to uncover the relation-
ships between them. Our analysis makes it clear that what really matters for the structure
of the space-economy is not just the level of economic integration, but the interplay between
transportation costs and urban costs.
It is worth noting that our model has proven to be easy to handle, while retaining
most general equilibrium eﬀects. This suggests that it can be used as a building-block in a
more general setting, such as growth models with inﬁnitely-lived consumers or overlapping
generations. This, in turn, should permit the study of the long-run impact of urban and
transportation costs on the structure, size and number of cities in a dynamic context.
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17Figure 1: Break and sustain points.
Figure 1a: T-break, T-sustain, θ-break, and θ-sustain points (σ ≤ 3).
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Figure 1b: T-break, T-sustain, θ-break, and θ-sustain points (σ>3).
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A: Agglomeration is a stable equilibrium
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18Figure 2: Real wage diﬀerentials (θ =0 .200 and σ =2 .5).
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Figure 2a: Real wage differential for T =1 .090
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Figure 2b: Real wage differential for T =1 .072
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Figure 2c: Real wage differential for T =1 .050
19Figure 3: Real wage diﬀerentials (T =1 .072 and σ =2 .5).
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Figure 3a: Real wage differential for theta=0 .220
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Figure 3b: Real wage differential for theta=0 .200
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Figure 3c: Real wage differential for theta=0 .180
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